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1	  	  
Abstract	  Pashtuns	  have	  been	  politically	  dominant	  in	  Afghanistan	  for	  over	  300	  years,	  and	  this	  has	  led	  non-­‐Pashtun	  ethnic	  groups	  to	  develop	  grievances	  and	  share	  a	  common	  identity,	  non-­‐
Pashtun.	  The	  present	  study	  analyzes	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethnic	  identity	  and	  nationalism	  in	  Pashtun	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  Afghan	  Fulbright	  students	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Afghanistan.	  No	  empirical	  research	  on	  ethnicity	  and	  nationalism	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  found	  in	  the	  review	  of	  literature.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  study	  to	  answer	  how	  the	  notion	  non-­‐
Pashtun	  is	  constructed	  in	  Afghanistan	  by	  applying	  a	  mixed-­‐method	  research	  methodology.	  The	  findings	  suggested	  that	  “non-­‐Pashtun”	  is	  a	  pan-­‐ethnic	  identity,	  which	  allows	  members	  of	  non-­‐Pashtun	  ethnic	  groups	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  Pashtuns.	  Non-­‐Pashtuns	  negotiate	  their	  individual	  ethnic	  identity	  by	  adding	  the	  “non-­‐Pashtun”	  pan-­‐ethnic	  layer	  to	  remove	  the	  fear	  of	  continuous	  domination	  and	  exclusion	  by	  the	  Pashtuns.	  Last,	  the	  research	  adds	  information	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  modernization	  in	  construction	  of	  the	  “non-­‐Pashtun”	  pan-­‐ethnic	  layer.	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1.	  Introduction	  
In Afghanistan, meaning land of Afghans, live more than fifty ethnic groups that have 
continually been engaged in conflicts against each other for at least the past few decades. 
Situated between Iran and Pakistan, it is an area about the size of Texas, larger than France, 
rather smaller than Turkey (Ewans 2002, 1-2).  Its total population is 30 million people, and the 
major ethnic groups are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks who together make up 87% of the 
population. Pashtuns constitute 42% of the population and speak Pashtu. Tajiks with population 
of 27% are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Hazaras and Uzbeks each make 9% 
of the Afghan population (Adeney 2008, 538).  
Table 1: 
Ethnic	  Groups	   Population	   Percentage	   Language	  Pashtun	   12,600,000	   42%	   Pashtu	  Tajik	   7,200,000	   27%	   Persian	  Hazara	   2,700,000	   9%	   Persian	  Uzbek	   2,700,000	   9%	   Uzbeki	  
Although it is debated that there is no valid and unbiased data on the Afghan population 
due to the absence of an up-to-date census and large flows of refugees throughout three decades 
of war, it is largely accepted that Pashtuns are the largest group, Tajiks make the second largest, 
and Hazaras and Uzbeks come third and fourth respectively.  
Throughout the past two and a half centuries, almost every Afghan king and president has 
been a member of the Pashtun ethnic group. Pashtuns have been politically a dominant ethnic 
group and their dominance remains secure still today. Despite the ethnic tensions among non-
Pashtun ethnic groups, they have established a collective ‘non-Pashtun’ ethnic identity to 
challenge Pashtuns’ dominance in the state level. The borderline between Pashtuns and non-
Pashtuns is not historically very old, but it certainly is a product of history and predates the 
	   3	  
current young generation. Similar to the role the previous generation played in shaping the ethnic 
identities and relations in the past, the Afghan young generation will have a key role to play in 
determining the fate of this boundary for the next generations to come. Whether the ethnic line 
between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns will diminish will significantly depend on the youth’s role. 
Given the youth’s important future role, this research is going to investigate the worrying ethnic 
division and tensions between Pashtuns and non-Pashtun ethnic groups over state power. This 
research has been designed to study the notion of non-Pashtun as an ethnic identity and border, 
and the way it is constructed within a particular group of Afghan students known as Fulbright 
scholars. 
2.	  Research	  Purpose	  
According to UNFPA, Afghanistan is one of the world’s youngest and fastest growing 
populations at an annual rate of population growth of 3.1 percent (2012; 112). Its youth make up 
a vast proportion of the literate population of 38.2%. The Afghan youth have made significant 
progress in terms of education since the start of the post-Taliban era. The schools closed or 
turned into dust during the war and the Taliban era were reopened and reconstructed after the 
collapse of their regime, and many more schools were newly constructed to increase the literacy 
rate among Afghans. At the same time, girls were freed to pursue education. These factors have 
certainly provided the post-Taliban young generation of Afghanistan with better access to 
education than those who spent their youth during the years of war and immigration from one 
part of the world to another without being able to pursue proper and uninterrupted education.  
That is primarily the reason why the majority of youth fortunate to be able to learn to 
read and write and access educational institutions are seen as a great source of hope for the 
development of the country. Since youth make up a large portion of the literate population, the 
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fate of the country is going to be greatly shaped by their visions as well as contributions. What 
role the educated youth will play to deal particularly with ethnic tensions, and whether their 
decisions and actions will contribute to the disunity of ethnic groups are two important questions 
to ask. 
The youth’s role is going to be significant in the long term for Afghanistan. Their thirst 
for higher education and learning since the fall of the Taliban demonstrates their sense of 
responsibility for the country’s future. Almost every Afghan put an end to learning in order to 
protect themselves and their families during the war, and there were only a few universities open 
during the Taliban era in the entire country. In contrast, there are 135 universities (101 private 
and 34 public) registered and fully functional according to the Ministry of Higher Education. As 
they have already occupied key positions in the governmental and private sectors, the need for 
their contribution will grow more and more as the country moves towards development. 
Afghanistan’s peace-process, state building, and development will depend on whether the youth 
will use their education as a weapon to strengthen their ethnic solidarities, or as a tool to resolve 
the ethnic disputes and promote nationalism.  
Among the educated youth, there are over 450 Afghan Fulbright scholars who serve their 
country. These individuals make up a great portion of Afghan youth privileged with higher 
education degrees at the master’s and PhD levels. Every year around 50 young Afghans receive 
fully funded scholarships to pursue their graduate studies in the United States. Two great 
examples to represent the Afghan Fulbright scholars are the current Afghan President Ashraf 
Ghani and the Afghan Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, Assadullah Zamir. However, one 
cannot rely on education to predict the future of the country, because education cannot be the 
determinant by itself. The individuals who sparked and intensified the war against the Soviet 
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Union and the civil war held higher education degrees. They held degrees from distinguished 
institutions in Afghanistan and foreign countries. Some of them are no longer alive, but some are 
still influential characters in the social and political affairs of Afghanistan. Are the youth going 
to support their ethno-political agendas, or will they rather work towards building nationalism?   
Given the youth’s important position in the future of Afghanistan, particularly that of 
Fulbright scholars who make the vast majority of master’s/PhD degree holders in the entire 
country, this research’s target population is the Afghan Fulbright scholars.  
3.	  Background	  Information	  and	  Overview	  
Despite the beautiful landscape and high mountains that cover the country, Afghanistan is 
mostly known now as the land of war and terrorism in the world. As a matter of fact, terrorism 
flourished in Afghanistan because of the internal ethnic wars that paved the way for insurgency, 
radicalism, and terrorism. The country enjoyed progress, modernization, and peace until the mid-
1970s. Later, fighting organizations known as the mujahideen mobilized and started the war 
against the Soviet occupation. The war was known as jihad (holy war). Mujahideen fought the 
Soviets in Afghanistan tirelessly until 1989 when the Soviets decided to withdraw, but 
mujahideen did not decide to drop their weapons and put an end to their holy war. They changed 
their agenda from religious to ethnic, and the war against the Afghan state continued. The 
various leaders of local groups engaged in the civil war used group identity in the pursuit of 
power and resources by reinterpreting history around symbol of ethnic or religious differences 
(Riphenburg 2005; 36). 
Upon the withdrawal of the Soviets, Najibullah remained as the Afghan President. 
Mujahideen continued their resistance and fight against him. They succeeded in removing him 
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from power and taking over the state in 1992. From 1992 to 1996, the leaders of all the 
mujahideen leaders, who remained united against the Soviet occupation, were ethnically divided 
and fought each other over the power.  
Before delving further into the history, it is necessary to pause and ask why the 
mujahideen still fought the Afghan President for three more years if the purpose of their holy war 
was only to fight the non-Muslim occupants. Was it the Islamic teaching of jihad that had 
motivated them to take up arms and turn Afghanistan into a battlefield, or was it ethnic 
antagonism that led the war to assume an ethnic character after the Soviet withdrawal? 
Since a Pashtun king Ahmad Shah Durrani established the Afghan state in 1747, Pashtuns 
have enjoyed massive political dominance. Among the many kings and presidents, only two non-
Pashtuns have managed to possess the state power. However, their success was short-lived and 
Pashtuns were able to reverse their political decline. Habibullah Kalakani was the first non-
Pashtun to inhabit the state for one year after removing a Pashtun king in 1929. Burhanuddin 
Rabbani –one of the prominent leaders of the mujahideen– was the second non-Pashtun to rule 
from 1992 to 1996 in the state. After 1996, Pashtuns regained power and resumed their 
dominance until today. The Taliban –predominantly a Pashtun group– ruled from 1996 to 2001. 
From immediately after the U.S. invasion until mid-2014, Hamed Karzai (Pashtun) inhabited the 
Presidential Palace. After Hamed Karzai, Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun) took over the leadership until 
the present.  
For over three hundred years, non-Pashtuns have not ruled the country even for a decade. 
Before the war, 57.9% of Afghan political elites were Pashtuns, while Tajiks (the second largest 
ethnic group) made up only 29.2% and other non-Pashtun groups made up far less (Ahady 1995; 
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633). Pashtuns believe that they constitute the majority in Afghanistan, that the Afghan state was 
formed by the Pashtuns and that Afghanistan is the only Pashtun state in the world, the 
minorities should accept the Pashtun character of the state (Ahady 1995; 634).   
This ethnic division has intensified since the Presidential elections in 2014 when the 
election results were disputed. Abdullah Abdullah, a candidate supported by the vast majority of 
non-Pashtuns won the first round of elections with 45% of votes, while Ashraf Ghani, supported 
by Pashtuns, won 31% of votes. Because no candidate was able to secure over 50% of the total 
votes, a runoff round was held later in the year between the two leading candidates. Ethnic 
Pashtun Ashraf Ghani won the runoff round, leading by 13%. Hoping to reduce the Pashtun 
dominance in the state, Abdullah Abdullah and his non-Pashtun supporters rejected the results 
and claimed that the elections process was biased and fraudulent. After ethnic tensions sparked 
between the candidates and their supporters, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made multiple 
visits to Afghanistan to resolve the disputes between the candidates and bring both to an 
agreement. After talks, arguments, and warnings exchanged by the two candidates, the Pashtun 
candidate was announced the new President and his rival was named the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the new unity government. Despite the difference in their positions, the President 
agreed to share 50% of power with the CEO. As a consequence, after votes were cast along 
ethnic lines and the candidates reinforced ethnic borders to attract votes from various ethnic 
groups, the division between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns intensified massively.  
The long-standing dominance of Pashtuns and the recent ethnic tensions can potentially 
lead to violence once again. The power sharing agreement can increase the risk of ethnic 
violence too. The fact that the President, unlike all other Pashtun leaders, has to share 50% of 
power with the CEO can lead both the President and the CEO to compete for more power. 
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Pashtuns might strive to reverse the decline of their dominance, and non-Pashtuns might strive to 
increase the possibility of Pashtuns’ decline in dominance. Whether the ethnic politics and ethnic 
hostilities are going to turn into ethnic war or not depends on how patiently and intelligently the 
two leaders will lead and abide by their agreements.  Ethnic conciseness is a serious issue in 
Afghanistan. One of the participants pointed out to this issue by stating that “everyone has 
ethnic-oriented objectives in Afghanistan,” and these words, I believe, call for the seriousness of 
this issue and the urgency for investigating and eliminating it. 
4.	  Literature	  Review	  
Studying ethnic conflicts has been a major focus of scholars of social sciences. The 
literature on ethnic conflicts is massive, but Afghanistan is one of the societies least studied. 
Despite years of ethnic conflicts and billions of dollars of aid, there is a dearth of scholarship on 
the study of ethnic relations in Afghanistan. After reviewing the literature, I discovered that no 
sociologist has ever conducted an empirical study of ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, and ethnic 
relations in Afghanistan. Therefore, I reviewed the literature on other countries of the world such 
as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Sudan, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, India, United States, etc. 
4.1	   Definitions	  	  
There is no consensus on any single definition of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ among 
scholars. The terms ethnicity, ethnic group, race, and nationhood, and nationalism have often 
been confused and used as synonyms. According to Robin Williams Jr., problems of definition 
are difficult be resolved and the disagreements will continue regarding how best to characterize 
such terms as ethnicity, ethnic group, mobilization, nation, and nationalism (1994; 52). Werner 
Sollors (1978), referring to Andrew M. Greeley, explains the difficulties of the term ethnicity in 
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the United States. Like in other countries, in the United States ethnicity in the wider sense has 
been referred to any distinction based on nationality, race, religion, or language. As the problem 
in the American context is that some groups that Americans think of as ‘ethnic’ are constituted 
by religion (Jews), some by nationality (Poles), some by religion and nationality (Irish 
Catholics), some by race (blacks) some by language, and some by region, similar confusions are 
present among the scholars of other countries. 
Some scholars have suggested that common race, language, culture, appearance, 
ancestry, and regional origin are the notions that form an ethnic identity (Kearney 1978; Milton   
1985; Sanders 2002; Kastoryano and Schader 2014; Horowitz 1985). A number of scholars have 
emphasized only the descent-based attribute of ethnic groups, arguing that common descent is a 
necessary belief for ethnic groups (Chandra 2012; Weber 1978). Joane Nagel (1994) has defined 
ethnicity as a boundary that determines who is a member of an ethnic group and who is not and 
designates which ethnic categories are available for identification at a particular time and place. 
Far from other explanations, Fredrick Barth (1969) explains the notion of ethnicity as a mutable 
concept that comes to existence by a labeling process by oneself and others. According to his 
definition, ethnic identity is the outcome of dialectical process of what one thinks his/her 
ethnicity is vs. what others think his/her ethnicity is.  
However, Williams.’s explanation of the two different conceptions of “nationalism” is 
helpful with understanding ethnic identity’s role in a national identity. According to him (1994; 
53), the term “nationalism” is used to refer to two quite different conceptions: (i) identification 
with and loyalty to the state structure, regardless of ethnic composition of the population (such as 
American, Argentinian, etc.); (ii) identification with and loyalty to an ethnic/religious 
“nationality” that may or may coincide with a state’s jurisdiction (Scottish, Tamil). Thomas 
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Barfield has defined ethnic group in Afghanistan in his book Afghanistan: A Political and 
Cultural History as social groups that meet four criteria. First, they are physically replicating. 
Second, they share fundamental cultural values. Third, ethnic groups in Afghanistan constitute a 
field of communication and interaction. The last criterion is that “they are defined through self-
definition and through definition by others” (2010, 20-21).  
To explain how ethnic boundaries change and are flexible for negotiation, Nagel, using 
Fredrick Barth’s definition, has argued that people’s conceptions of themselves along ethnic 
lines, especially their ethnic identity, are situational and changeable. “As the individual (or 
group) moves through daily life, ethnicity can change according to variations in the situations 
and audiences encountered” (1994; 154). Then he concludes, “ethnic identity is the result of a 
dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the 
individual’s self-identification and outsider’s ethnic designations – what you think your ethnicity 
is, versus what they think your ethnicity is” (Nagel 1994; 154). Mary Waters’s research with the 
63rd and 64th generation of white ethnics in California and Pennsylvania, United States backs 
Nagel’s argument. Mary Waters concluded in her book Choosing Identities in America that 
ethnic identity is reconcilable depending on values of choice, individuality, and community 
(1990). 
To observe reconciliation or negotiation of ethnic identity, McBeth  (1989) came up with 
a new term “layering”. McBeth has argued that as audiences of individuals change, the socially 
defined array of ethnic identity becomes negotiable to individuals.  Consequently, this change 
produces “layering”. The layering of ethnic identity includes the ascriptive mode of revealing the 
negotiated and reconciled ethnic identity. In the book Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging 
Institutions and Identities, Yen Espiritu (1992) studied the concept of “layering” among Asian 
	   11	  
Americans. The author found that the “Asian” pan-ethnic is one level of identification, however 
the national origins (Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, etc.) remain as the basis of larger 
identification. She argued that the larger “Asian” pan-ethnic boundary is considered as an 
advantage in reaching resources or political power.  
Having reviewed the various definitions, I use Thomas Barfied’s definition to refer to 
ethnic groups in Afghanistan in this research. In Afghanistan, ethnic groups are biologically 
replicating. One cannot differentiate all the ethnic groups by their appearance. Every ethnic 
group has its own fundamental cultural values. They do not share the same culture. For example, 
every ethnic group has at least a few cultural practices that distinguish them from each other. 
They also have their own field of communication and interaction. Most of the ethnic groups 
speak their own language. However, there are a number of ethnic groups who share the same 
language. Yet, despite sharing the same language, they speak the language in different 
recognizable dialects. For example, both Tajik and Hazara ethnic groups speak the same Persian 
language. The difference lies in their different dialects by which one can differentiate them from 
each other. Finally, they are defined through self-definition and through definition by others. I 
think the last component of Barfield’s definition is extremely important to take into 
consideration to define ethnic groups in Afghanistan. This component has also been stressed by 
Fredrick Barth’s definition, which argues ethnic identity comes to existence through a labeling 
process by oneself and others. It is the outcome of what one thinks his/her ethnicity is vs. what 
others think his/her ethnicity is. The last component of Barfield’s definition is what drives 
member ethnic group to treat “ethnicity” as an identity in Afghanistan. Ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan are not only well aware of their own ethnic cultural practices, values, and meanings, 
but they are also conscious of perceptions that they have of each other’s ethnicity. The “self-
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definition” and “definition by others” are the two forces that turn the notion of ethnicity into 
identity, and then draw ethnic boundaries in Afghanistan. 
4.2	   Elements	  of	  Ethnic	  Conflicts	  	  
Another major part of studying “ethnicity” is to discover the factors or elements that 
create and increase ethnic tensions, and strengthen ethnic boundaries between ethnic groups. In 
the literature, words such as hostility, consciousness, antagonism, solidarity, competition, rivalry, 
tensions, and cleavages have been used interchangeably to refer to ethnic boundaries and the 
actions and reactions of two or more ethnic groups against each other in societies. Among the 
elements, the “state” plays an important role. States can cause and manage ethnic conflicts 
(Byman 2002). When lack of central government to enforce order is present, groups rely on their 
own resources for survival. To Paul Brass (1985), state is not only a tool or arena of an ethnic 
group, but it also is the greatest reward and resource. The resource for which ethnic groups 
engage in conflicts and become hostile to each other over the state power has been studied to be 
useful for mobilization and counter-mobilization (Williams 1994). Control of the state allows an 
ethnic group to transfer important economic assets to the members of their community (Esman 
1994). However, it’s important to understand the differences between competitions over 
resources. According Williams, there are peaceful individual competition and regularized 
collective opposition (in form of competition). The two are distinguished in the way that first 
former is based on rule-constrained individualized striving for scarce values, and the latter is 
defined based on collective actions aimed at displacing, neutralizing, injuring, or destroying the 
opponents (1994; 54). 
Though rivalry for the control of state does not always lead to ethnic antagonism even if 
ethnic-politics is present in a society, because the consequences of ethnic politics depend on the 
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interplay of conflict-fostering conditions and conflict-reducing processes and institutions 
(Horowitz 1989). For example, ethnic rivalries in Nigeria have been as intense as in Sudan. 
Despite the same intensity of ethnic tensions in both countries, Sudan has experienced its second 
civil war while Nigeria has been successful in preventing any other civil war since its first one 
between 1967 and 1970. The difference lies in conditions of conflict-management institutions in 
both states. Victor T. Le Vine’s (1997) model describes the stages through which ethnic conflicts 
take place – the incipient stage, open stage, and out of control stage. In this model, he explains 
that conflict is manageable in the first stage; it intensifies in the second stage however it could be 
still managed; and conflict takes place in the third stage and is hard to manage. 
Other factors associated to ethnic tensions that are not limited to the state’s role have 
been studied too. Retrieval of cultural heritage by the Sinhalese dominant ethnic group, and 
removal of the Sinhalese political domination by Tamils in Sri Lanka have been observed to be 
the two mechanisms behind the ethnic tensions and conflicts in Sri Lanka (Kearney 1978). Even 
though ethnic consciousness eternally appears to be everywhere, it is only realized when ethnic 
groups feel either threatened with a loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel that it 
is an opportune moment that politically to overcome long-standing denial or privilege 
(Wallerstein 1979). Modernity and the desire to be assessed along the dimensions of modernity 
in society also motivate individuals to engage in ethnic conflicts. The ones advantaged by 
modernity are recognized and feared by others and this leads to appearance of ethnic competition 
in societies such as in Calabar and Nigeria. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) argue 
that it is the collective fears (physical insecurity) for the future that cause intense ethnic conflict. 
Ethnic fear concerns people more about loss than to pursue (Kaufman 1998). Although Ronald 
Grigory Suny (2004) acknowledges the role of fear, anger, hatred, and resentment, he – by 
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summarizing these elements in the concept of emotions – argues that emotions motivate ethnic 
hostilities because behind any human action – such as deciding to engage in ethnic competition – 
emotional motives lie. Where resources are scarce and where there is prior risk of ethnic 
violence, education, too, can be a potential contributor to ethnic hostilities and violence (Lange 
2011). 
While some invalid assumptions are made that multiplicity of ethnic groups can cause 
ethnic conflict, Carol Riphenburg has argued that the multiplicity of ethnic groups does not alone 
make for violence and conflict (2005). Rather, countries containing a single large ethnic group or 
two evenly matched groups have been found to be more prone to conflict than those containing a 
larger number of equally sized ethnic groups (Posner 2003). In contrast to considering only the 
size of one or more ethnic groups in a country, Carol Riphenburg has studied the population size 
of a country with other variables and their effects on ethnic war (2005). By placing Pashtuns’ 
political dominance in the center of her observations of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, 
Riphenburg argues that Afghanistan ranks high on all of the indicators that predispose a country 
to insurgency.  These indicators include poverty, political instability, rugged terrain, and a large 
population. According to her research, if these indicators are present in a society, the country is 
more prone to civil war than ever.  
4.3	   Theories	  
A variety of theories have been used to examine and draw pictures of ethnic relations in 
social sciences. Among the theories, competition theory is very-well known among the scholars 
who have studied the relationship between competition for economic success and ethnic 
antagonism in order to understand how ethnic boundaries function and are formed (Olzak 1994). 
Additionally, rational choice theory portrays ethnicity as a rational choice. Scholars have used 
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rational choice theory to argue that creation of ethnic boundaries or expression of ethnic identity 
could be utilized as a strategy to reach political and economic ends by individuals and groups 
(Hechter 1988). Kanchan Chandra (2007) has used rational choice theory to show that political 
parties rationally organize themselves along the ethnic borders as voters use ethnicity as a tool to 
support candidates too. Similarly, Russel Hardin (1997) applies rational choice theory to study 
establishment of ethnic groups and that creation of exclusionary norms can lead groups toward 
violence. Sociologists – to explain ethnic-based social organizations – have used the concept of 
social capital and collective actions rooted in interpersonal networks, and have examined how 
such actions and organizations can generate and distribute resources along ethnic lines (Sanders 
2002). Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner (1993) –taking the rational choice approach – 
have introduced two mechanisms of social capital, bounded solidarity and enforceable trust.  
Robert Bates’s (1974) framework based on the rational choice theory has been widely 
influential in the social sciences. This theory stresses the rational basis for ethnic competition 
and views that ethnic groups – formed by rational efforts – represent coalitions to ensure 
themselves advantages created by forces of modernizations that are desired in society but are 
scarce. Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Danial N. Posner (2010) have used Bates’s theory to 
study 35,000 respondents in 22 public opinion surveys in 10 countries. The researchers have 
found strong evidence that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political 
competition, and ethnic identity matters and is useful in the competition for political power. 
Game theorists have put efforts to use game theory to identify mechanisms of ethnic conflicts 
too. Among the mechanisms, credible commitment has been considered a major mechanism. 
James Fearon (1994) – using game theory – has argued that commitment problems can result in 
ethnic conflict in states where one dominant ethnic group has control of the state and at least one 
	   16	  
powerful minority ethnic group is present in the society too. This commitment problem either 
has lurked or caused inter-ethnic violence in countries such the former Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Estonia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.  
As reviewed, three major theories have informed the works of scholars cited above. 
Competition theory, game theory, and rational choice theory have been widely used to study 
ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries and their effects on ethnic hostilities and violence. Among 
these theories, rational choice theory is consistent with the findings of my research.  
Ethnic competition theory is mostly concerned with immigration’s effect on ethnic 
competition. For example, one of the major focuses of Susan Olzak’s work The Dynamics of 
Ethnic Competition and Conflict is to study the effects of immigration and other factors of 
economic competition on ethnic competitions. Similarly, game theory has been used to examine 
how political parties, states, and ethnic groups calculate the incentives, costs, and outcomes to 
strategize and decide whether to engage in ethnic wars or not. For example, James Fearon has 
studied the violent consequence of commitment problem when there is no third party to initiate 
an agreement between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities. By applying game theory, Fearon 
has argued that when ethnic minorities, such as Serbs in Croatia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and 
Ossetians in Georgia, anticipate that there is no guarantee that ethnic majority leaders protect 
their rights, they see fighting as the best way to resist the weak and barely formed state led by the 
majority regardless of what the majority agrees to. However, according to the theory, both 
parties will be worse off if they engage in ethnic war. Since neither immigration nor violence is 
concerned in my research, the ethnic competition theory and game theory frameworks are not 
suitable theories to explain my observations. In contrast, rational choice theory is mostly 
concerned with human actions and behavior as determinants of human decisions; and the theory 
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well suits this research’s findings and analysis. Particularly, Robert Bates’s theoretical 
framework developed based on the rational choice theory in Ethnic Competition and 
Modernization in Contemporary Africa will best explain the observations of this research. I will 
use his theoretical framework to explain my findings. The theoretical framework is discussed in 
detail in the Analysis section. 	  
5.	  Research	  Methodology	  
Since this research is to investigate how the participants construct their ethnic identity to 
distinguish themselves from each other (Pashtuns vs. non-Pashtuns), a qualitative approach 
added considerable strength to the study. I stratified the participants into two strata of Pashtun 
Afghan Fulbright Scholars and non-Pashtun Afghan Fulbright Scholars. I have created the two 
categories in an effort to compare the elements over which they build their Pashtun and non-
Pashtun ethnic identities, and the roots of ethnic problems in Afghanistan. 
5.1	   Research	  Question	  
Is	  “non-­‐Pashtun”	  only	  an	  ethnic	  identity	  or	  also	  an	  ethnic	  boundary?	  How	  is	  it	  constructed?	  
The question aims to investigate why scholars from different ethnic groups other than 
Pashtuns would identify themselves as non-Pashtun besides their individual ethnic identity, and 
how this identity functions as a boundary. In other words, why non-Pashtuns negotiate their 
individual ethnic identity and rather identify themselves as one ethnic group (non-Pashtuns) in 
discussion of the political access and dominance of Pashtuns. 
5.2	   Data	  Collection	  
There are over 450 Fulbright scholars from Afghanistan who have completed or are 
completing their education in the master’s and PhD levels in the United States. Although 
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Fulbright also offers non-degree programs to Afghans, this research’s target population is only 
those Fulbright scholars who pursued or currently pursue master’s or PhD graduate degrees.  
A survey questionnaire, attached in appendix A, was sent to over 450 participants. The 
Institute of International Education (IIE), which administers the Fulbright scholarship program 
for Afghan students in the United States, has the email directory of all Fulbright scholars (current 
students and alumni). Therefore, inviting the participants to participate in the online survey via 
email was the only and the best means of contacting the participants.  
The survey questionnaire served two purposes. First, I was able to collect information on 
ethnic identity of every Fulbright scholar who filled out the questionnaire. Second, it provided 
me with a frame based on which I drew the sample. Among all the Afghan Fulbright scholars, 36 
individuals completed and submitted the survey questionnaire.  
Ethnic information: To identify whether a participant belonged to the cluster of Pashtun 
Fulbright Scholars or non-Pashtun Fulbright Scholars, they were asked to provide their ethnic 
information. 15 participants identified themselves as Pashtuns, 1 as Hazara, 17 as Tajiks, and 3 
as members of other ethnic groups. See the below table. 
Table 2: 
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Pashtun vs. non-Pashtun: Since the study required that the participants be stratified into two 
ethnic subgroups, I labeled those identified as ‘Hazara’, ‘Tajik’, and ‘others’ as ‘non-Pashtuns’. 
Pashtuns made 42% of the total number of respondents (15 units), and non-Pashtuns made 58% 
(21 units). 
Table 3: 
	  
Sex: The other two variables I considered in sampling were ‘sex’ and ‘wealth’. Although I did 
not study their effects in the analysis, I ensured that the sample included both male and female 
participants with respect to their wealth status. List of the participants consisted of 5 female 
(14%) and 31 (86%) male Afghan Fulbright scholars. Among the 5 female participants, one 
participant was Pashtun and four were non-Pashtuns. Among the 31 male participants, 14 
participants were Pashtun and 17 were non-Pashtun. 
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Table 4: 
	  
Wealth: Instead of the traditional ‘socioeconomic status’ variable, I created a new variable 
wealth. The reason I decided to create the ‘wealth’ variable was that the classic concept of ‘class’ 
or ‘socioeconomic status’ has not grown yet in Afghan society, and there is no class marker 
based on which I could determine a participant’s ‘socioeconomic status’ or ‘wealth’. Afghanistan 
has a newly established capitalistic economic system that ages only a decade and a half. Also, a 
focus group with four Afghan Fulbright scholars (three male; one female) was conducted to test 
the survey questionnaire as well as the qualitative interview questions. I created the concept of 
‘wealth’ to measure their ‘socioeconomic status’. Each participant was asked if they had one of 
the four types of servants hired in their household. The servants included (1) a security person, 
(2) a cleaning person, (3) a driver, and (4) a cook. I gave the respondents ‘wealth scores’ based 
on the number of type of servants hired in their household. For example, if a respondent 
answered they had one type of servant hired e.g. a cleaner, I gave him/her ‘1 wealth score’; if 
two, I gave him/her ‘2 wealth score’; and similarly if none, I gave him/her ‘0 wealth score’. 
Based on that, I assigned the participants to 5 categories of wealth scores: ‘0 wealth’, ‘1 wealth’, 
‘2 wealth’, ‘3 wealth’, and ‘4 wealth’.  
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Table 5: 
	  
As shown in the above table, the majority of participants received ‘0 wealth score’ – 11 
Pashtuns and 13 non-Pashtuns. 8 participants received ‘1 wealth score’ – 2 Pashtuns and 6 non-
Pashtuns. 3 participants fell under the category of ‘2 wealth scores’, and only 1 participant 
responded that s/he had three types of servants hired in their household. No respondent had all 
four types of servants hired in their household; therefore, the above table does not include the 
fifth wealth category, meaning the ‘4 wealth score’. The table shows that the majority of 
participants (66%) with the score of 0 are the least wealthy. Four participants are the wealthiest 
with the scores of 2 and 3, although they make very small percentage (11%). 8 participants 
(22%) received a score of 1, which makes the second largest portion. 
The below table describes the Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants by their gender and 
wealth. However, the participants with 2 or more wealth scores have been dropped from this list 
because they were only 4 units (11%) of the total cases. In other words, 4 cases (two Pashtuns 
with 2 wealth scores, one Pashtun with 3 wealth scores, and two non-Pashtuns with 2 wealth 
scores) were considered outliers and, therefore, were dropped from the list of participants to 
avoid their inclusion in the sample. Only the participants with 0 and 1 wealth scores who make 
89% remained in the list.   
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Table 6: 
	  
I drew a sample for the qualitative observations from the above list by applying simple 
random sampling strategy to ensure that all the units had equal chances of selection. The sample 
includes 8 participants as shown below: 
Table 7: Pashtun	  Participants:	  
	  Non-­‐Pashtun	  Participants:	  
	  
Two	  Pashtuns	  with	  '0	  wealth	  scores'	  1	  male	  
1	  female	  
Two	  Pashtuns	  with	  '1	  wealth	  score'	  2	  male	  
Two	  non-­‐Pashtuns	  with	  '0	  wealth	  scores'	  
1	  male	  
1	  female	  
Two	  non-­‐Pashtuns	  with	  '1	  wealth	  score'	  1	  male	  
1	  female	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Each of the two strata of Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns included participants of both 
genders (male and female) and wealth scores (0 and 1). I conducted structured interviews with 
each sampled participant over Skype or phone. The interviews were conducted in three 
languages – Pashtu, Persian, and English. At the beginning of the interview, I informed the 
participant that s/he had freedom to choose the language of the interview s/he found convenient. 
Each interview lasted between 20 to 30 minutes, however I did not restrict participants’ 
responses for the sake of time. The interview questions, attached in the appendix with description 
of strategies and questions, were pre-tested. Both the survey questionnaire and interview 
questions were reviewed by my supervising professors and the Center for Social Research at 
Lehigh University, and they were also pretested by four Fulbright scholars (3 male, one female). 
I created the survey questionnaire by using the software called ‘Qualtrics’. I analyzed the survey 
data for the purpose of sampling and producing description of the participants by using the 
statistical software ‘Stata’. The survey data were saved in my personal Qualtrics online account, 
and the qualitative interview data were audio recorded.  
5.3	  	   Interviewing	  	  
I conducted all the interviews in a structured style, meaning that the interviews were 
conducted at specific scheduled times and the questions and the strategy to ask the questions 
were prepared before the interviews. All the questions were open-ended, and the interviews 
lasted for between 20 and 30 minutes.  
I started the interviews with broad questions. The first two questions were broad because 
I did not want my interviewees to understand the central topic of interview.  I narrowed the 
questions step by step. Since the topic of ethnic relations is sometimes too sensitive for Afghans, 
I emphasized to the interviewees that they had freedom to say whatever they wished. I also 
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insisted that I had no interest in hearing any specific answers, and no answer would upset me. I 
also ensured that the participants speak in the language (Pashtu, Persian, or English) they were 
comfortable with the most. The following table includes the questions and instructions I followed 
during the interviews to ensure that the data I collected from every participant provided me with 
valid answers to the questions of this research. 
Table 8: 
 
1.	  Elements	  of	  unity	  
• What	  are	  those	  elements	  that	  keep	  all	  Afghans	  united?	  
2.	  Elements	  of	  disunity	  
• What	  are	  those	  elements	  that	  do	  not	  let	  all	  Afghans	  be	  united?	  
3.	  Ethnic	  related	  elements	  
• You	  said	  that	  the	  X	  and	  Y	  elements	  prevent	  Afghans	  from	  being	  united.	  Why	  are	  these	  elements	  present	  in	  the	  Afghan	  society?	  
4.	  Elements	  and	  examples	  of	  conflicts	  between	  Pashtuns	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  ethnic	  
group/s	  
• Do	  these	  elements	  exist	  among	  youth?	  
• Next	  question:	  speaking	  of	  the	  youth	  reminded	  me	  of	  an	  incident.	  Pashtun	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  students	  of	  Kabul	  University	  have	  engaged	  in	  bloody	  fights	  against	  each	  other	  over	  the	  name	  of	  the	  university.	  Pashtuns	  have	  insisted	  that	  the	  name	  on	  the	  board	  has	  to	  remain	  only	  in	  Pashtu	  Language	  as	  it	  is,	  but	  students	  of	  other	  ethnicities	  have	  tried	  to	  put	  a	  new	  board	  including	  Persian	  translation	  of	  the	  text.	  My	  question	  is	  why	  is	  language,	  or	  just	  a	  name	  so	  important	  to	  both	  Pashtun	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  students?	  And	  why	  does	  this	  conflict	  happen	  between	  Pashtun	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  students?	  	  
• Next	  question:	  such	  conflicts	  between	  Pashtuns	  and	  non-­‐Pashtuns	  do	  not	  happen	  only	  among	  youth.	  For	  example,	  there	  was	  a	  dispute	  during	  the	  Loya	  Jirga	  convention	  in	  2004	  about	  the	  language	  of	  national	  anthem.	  Some	  Pashtun	  members	  insisted	  that	  the	  national	  language	  be	  sung	  in	  Pashtu,	  while	  others	  insisted	  that	  it	  must	  remain	  in	  Persian	  Language.	  Finally,	  the	  Pashtuns	  won	  the	  bargain	  and	  now	  our	  national	  anthem	  is	  Pashtu	  Language.	  What’s	  your	  opinion	  on	  that?	  
5.	  In	  depth	  discussion	  on	  Pashtun	  vs.	  non-­‐Pashtun	  conflicts	  
• Why	  these	  non-­‐Pashtuns	  think	  it’s	  so	  important	  for	  them	  to	  fight	  and	  debate	  over	  things	  against	  Pashtuns?	  Or,	  why	  do	  these	  Pashtuns	  think	  it’s	  so	  important	  for	  them	  to	  fight	  back?	  
6.	  Roots	  of	  problems	  
• What	  are	  the	  roots	  of	  such	  ethnic	  problems?	  	  
7.	  Political	  dominance	  of	  Pashtuns	  
• If	  the	  answer	  is	  not	  on	  the	  political	  dominance	  of	  Pashtuns:	  some	  Afghans	  refer	  to	  our	  history	  to	  express	  their	  anger.	  For	  example,	  some	  refer	  to	  the	  name	  of	  the	  country	  
Afghanistan	  to	  associate	  the	  problems	  with	  Pashtuns.	  Why	  making	  reference	  to	  just	  a	  name	  is	  so	  important	  to	  them?	  Why	  do	  they	  even	  refer	  to	  the	  history?	  Are	  the	  roots	  of	  problems	  in	  our	  history?	  
8.	  Discussion	  on	  the	  political	  dominance	  of	  Pashtuns	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• How	  is	  their	  political	  dominance	  related	  to	  the	  present	  ethnic	  relations?	  
5.4	   Data	  Analysis	  Methodology	  	  
The major questions of the interviews were on two topics: (1) elements of unity and 
disunity, and (2) roots of ethnic problems. I created four tables to be able to observe opinions of 
Pashtun and non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars on both topics comparatively.  
The first table included opinions of non-Pashtun participants on elements of unity and 
disunity. I created two different categories for their opinions – one for the elements of unity, and 
one for the elements of disunity. Although they pointed out to various elements some of which 
were related to the discussion of ethnicity in Afghanistan and some of which were not related, I 
picked the four major ethnic-related elements that were emphasized the most.  
I created the same table for the opinions of Pashtun Fulbright scholars. Similar to the first 
table, I divided their opinions into two categories of elements of unity and elements of disunity as 
well. After the list of responses for both groups of respondents was prepared and their responses 
were listed under their categories accordingly, I found similarities as well as dissimilarities in 
their opinions. They shared the same opinions on two elements that both groups had mentioned; 
however, the non-Pashtun respondents had emphasized two different elements based on which I 
drew my conclusions on construction of their non-Pashtun identity.  
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Table 9: 
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Table 10: 
	  
Next, I created two more tables – one for responses of non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars 
and one for those of Pashtun Fulbright scholars on the roots of ethnic problems. Among the 
responses, non-Pashtun participants had strongly emphasized only one source of ethnic 
problems, political dominance of Pashtuns. Pashtun Fulbright scholars, in contrast, argued that 
lack of official and up-to-date census data to determine what ethnicity is the largest [to have to 
certain privileges], and foreign countries’ roles in the political and social affairs of Afghanistan 
are the two major sources of problems, and they did not discuss any word on the dominance of 
Pashtuns in the state. Based on their emphasis on these elements, I drew my conclusions on the 
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role of these issues in the ethnic borderline between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, and on the 
importance of state as a reward for both ethnic categories.  
Table 11: 
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Table 12: 
	  
The above four tables display the method I used to analyze the data and draw conclusions 
in response to the research question. The ‘findings’ section consists of in-depth discussion on the 
responses of the participants on both topics of elements of unity and disunity as well as roots of 
ethnic problems.  
5.5	   Weaknesses	  and	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Research	  	  
Although I acknowledge that there are many flaws in my research methodology, I am 
going to underline a few of the major weaknesses and limitations that might have affected the 
results I present.  
The number of respondents based on which I drew a random sample for this research was 
very small. Given the population of Afghan Fulbright scholars (over 450) who have completed 
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or are completing a master’s or PhD degree in the United States, very few Fulbright scholars 
participated in the online self-administered survey. Therefore, by no means do I claim that the 
sample for this research is absolutely representative of the entire of population.  
The topic of this research might have prevented the participants from expressing their 
complete and honest opinions. Since ethnicity is an extremely politicized concept in Afghanistan 
due to which millions of Afghans lost their lives during the civil war, even discussing this topic 
could be associated with fear, let alone expressing fully honest opinions. Since childhood, my 
parents have always insisted to me as well as my siblings to avoid ethnic related discussions with 
anyone outside the house. Ethnic identity is so important to Afghans that one could be easily 
offended by a single opinion on his/her ethnicity. That is why it was not only a challenge for me 
to ensure the interviewees felt absolutely free and comfortable to provide me with their honest 
responses, but I also felt that my own ethnic identity might have had influence on their 
responses. I avoided telling the interviewees about my parents’ ethnic identities. However, I 
realized that it was not a secret to my interviewees that I came from an ethnic-Pashtun father and 
an ethnic-Tajik mother. After I had stopped the recording after an interview, one of the non-
Pashtun participants apologized to me for speaking frankly about Pashtuns and their political 
dominance although I did not feel offended at all. She said that she liked to be frank and honest 
about her opinions; however, the fact that she apologized to me implies that she was conscious of 
my ethnic identity throughout the entire interview and that – I believe – might have affected the 
results.  
Furthermore, two out of three female participants answered the interview questions in 
English, as opposed to only one out of five male participants. Afghanistan is a very male-
dominated society. There are many privileges in being ‘male’ as opposed to female due to the 
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oppressive and conservative norms regulating the lives of women. There is a huge gap between 
the rate of female education and male education. Men by far have better access to education than 
women, and that gives them access to many other privileges in society. Although I insisted to all 
the eight participants to speak in any language they were comfortable with, the majority of 
female respondents, as opposed to male participants, responded in English. English Language is 
a marker of one’s intelligence and status in Afghan society. The more fluent and confident an 
Afghan is in English, the more he or she can claim status in society. I feel that the dominance I 
can practice automatically for being male might have led the female participants to speak in 
English Language. They might have been more confident to present better and more fluent 
answers in one of the local languages.  
6.	  Research	  Findings	  
I have divided the findings of this research into two categories. The first category 
includes the elements that contribute to the unity and disunity of Afghans. Although the 
participants pointed out to many elements, only the elements that are concerned with the notion 
of ethnicity were selected and introduced here. The second category discusses the roots of ethnic 
problems. The discussion of the findings in the next section will provide us the answer for our 
research questions. 
6.1	   Elements	  of	  Unity	  and	  Disunity	  in	  Afghanistan	  
I found the Fulbright scholars very much interested in discussing what unites and 
disunities people in Afghanistan. The first question I asked in the interviews was “what are the 
elements that unite or keep all Afghans together?” The second question was “what are the 
elements that do not allow Afghans to be united?”  Although both questions are almost the same, 
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I asked both questions to observe whether their responses (the positive elements for the unity of 
Afghans and the negative elements that lead to disunity) were related to the topic of “ethnic 
relations and ethnic identity” or not.  
As I expected, all the eight participants brought up the topic of ethnic relations and ethnic 
identity voluntarily. Most of them pointed out to ethnic related elements immediately in response 
to my questions. “Ethnicity” established the central point of participants’ responses. They put 
very much emphasis on ethnic relations in Afghanistan. As I expected and planned, all the 
participants mentioned the word “ethnicity” before I made any attempt to direct their attention to 
this topic.  
Among the many elements mentioned by the participations, I found four major ones. 
Pashtun and non-Pashtun Fulbrighters shared the same views on two of the elements; however, 
non-Pashtun participants emphasized the importance of two additional elements that Pashtun 
participants seemed to be skeptical about. I have underlined the elements on which both Pashtun 
and non-Pashtun scholars shared agreement. The non-underlined elements are only the opinions 
of non-Pashtun scholars.  
Table 13: 
Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Participants’	  Opinions	  Elements	  of	  National	  Unity	   • Sports	  Elements	  of	  Disunity	   • Ethnic	  agenda	  	  
Non-­‐Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Participants’	  Opinions	  Elements	  of	  National	  Unity	   • Sports	  
• Power	  sharing	  Elements	  of	  Disunity	   • Ethnic	  agenda	  
• Ethnic	  competition	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6.2	   Ethnic	  Agenda	  and	  Sports:	  Shared	  Views	  of	  Pashtun	  and	  non-­‐Pashtun	  Fulbright	  
scholars  
As the tables illustrate, both Pashtun and non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars shared the same 
view on one element of unity (ethnic agenda) and on one element of disunity (sports).  
Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants agreed that sports in Afghanistan have largely 
contributed to the unity of Afghans. By sports, the participants meant the Afghan national teams 
that have represented Afghanistan internationally. One of the Pashtun participants stated “sports 
can play a major role in uniting Afghans, because Afghans do not care about ethnicity when they 
support the Afghan national teams.” According to a non-Pashtun scholar, “Sports in Afghanistan 
have brought all Afghans of every ethnicity together to cheer for our national teams.”  
The very first element that the majority of both Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants 
pointed out to was “sports”. Afghanistan has made significant progress in sports since the fall of 
the Taliban regime. Its taekwondo athletes are the winners of medals in the Olympic games; its 
cricket team has represented Afghanistan in the Cricket World Cup games a few times; and its 
soccer team secured the title of ‘South Asian Champions’ in 2014. As ethnic relations seem to be 
a complicated issue in the Afghan society, sports have reduced the ethnic antagonisms to some 
extent. In contrast to ethnicity, sports have not been politicized in Afghanistan. As stated by the 
participants, sports do not represent any ethnic identity and ethnic groups do not seek any 
advantages through sports to strengthen their ethnic solidarities.  
Every time that sport was said to be a great element of unity among Afghans, the 
participants would explain the reason behind it. Unlike in other countries where nationalism is 
well established among its masses and where sports promote a pre-established national identity, 
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in Afghanistan the concept of ‘national identity’ is absent. Importance of sports in Afghanistan 
lies in the fact that it dissolves ethnic solidarities and brings Afghans of all ethnic groups to cheer 
for their national teams temporarily – only for the period of time the national sports team 
represents the country. 
While Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants’ reasons in regards to the importance of 
sports demonstrate how greatly ethnic hostilities challenge the concept of nationalism in 
Afghanistan, they still felt obliged to point out to the dilemma of ethnic relations in response to 
the question “what are the elements that do not keep Afghans united?” to emphasize on its role 
in reinforcing borders across the ethnic lines.  
To invite the interviewees to dig deeper into the discussion of ethnic relations, I would 
ask them for their opinions on the ‘elements of unity’ as well as ‘elements of disunity’. As 
discussed above, the term ‘sports’ was the central theme of discussion of both Pashtun and non-
Pashtun participants as an element of unity. In discussion of the ‘elements of disunity’, the 
participants of both ethnic categories emphasized on what I have coded as “ethnic agenda.” By 
“ethnic agenda” the participants stressed on how important ethnic identity is to Afghans, which 
determines their social relations and personal behaviors in society. Both Pashtun and non-
Pashtun shared the same views on this issue. A non-Pashtun Fulbright scholar pointed to the 
phenomenon in her words, as “being conscious of their ethnicity is a big problem among 
Afghans.”  
When I asked the scholars what they meant by ‘ethnic conscience’ for the sake of clarity, 
they said that Afghans on a daily basis show extreme eagerness to find out the ethnic identity of 
their fellows around them. It is not only that they are interested in knowing the ethnic identity of 
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the second and third persons; it is because their interest comes from their ethnic conciseness. 
They are always aware of their own ethnic identity; therefore, they believe they must be aware of 
the ethnic identity of the people they encounter too. A Pashtun scholar underlined the 
phenomenon stating that “everyone has ethnic-oriented objectives for himself or herself.” 
Another non-Pashtun scholar also argued “Afghans should accept each other as brothers and 
sisters regardless of their ethnicities. We care too much about ethnicities.”  
6.3	   Ethnic	  Competition	  and	  Power	  Sharing:	  Views	  of	  non-­‐Pashtun	  Fulbright	  
Scholars	  
The research findings on elements of unity and disunity included two more major themes 
that were emphasized only by non-Pashtun participants. I coded the first element as ‘ethnic 
competitions’ and the second element as ‘power sharing’. 
The element ‘ethnic competition’ over resources and jobs in particular was discussed as 
an indicator of disunity among ethnic groups in Afghanistan. All non-Pashtun scholars stated that 
competitions over resources –jobs in particular– have largely accelerated ethnic hostilities and 
discrimination among ethnic groups. Although competition does not always carry a negative 
meaning, the non-Pashtun participants meant to suggest the biased and discriminatory aspect of 
the ethnic competitions as an element of disunity. A non-Pashtun scholar stated, “There are a lot 
of ethnic competitions. If a Pashtun is in a leadership position in an organization, everyone he 
hires is Pashtuns. Same applies to people of other ethnic groups.” Another non-Pashtun scholar 
said, “Transparency in the employment system should be reinforced, because Afghans seek to 
hire people from their ethnic group. “ 
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The other element non-Pashtun scholars discussed, as an element of unity was “power 
sharing.”  As I explained regarding the current state of Afghanistan in the “Background 
Information and Overview” section earlier, the Afghan 2014 presidential elections dilemma 
ended with the agreement of both candidates to share the state power. The President (Pashtun) 
shares 50% of the state power with the Chief Executive Officer who identifies himself as Tajik 
(non-Pashtun). While this agreement was not in favor of the Pashtun president and his Pashtun-
majority supporters, non-Pashtun participants believe that this agreement will reduce the ethnic 
hostilities in Afghanistan. One of the non-Pashtun participants said: 
“Power sharing should be considered an element of unity. Although our leaders are sharing 
power just because they won votes from their ethnic populations which is bad, but I still am 
in favor of this because at least this has led to removal of ethnic tensions between the leaders 
and their supporters.”  
6.4	   Roots	  of	  Ethnic	  Problems	  in	  Afghanistan	  
Afghanistan’s history has had very much influence on the current ethnic relations and 
behaviors of Afghans. ‘History’ is a central topic of discussion among Afghans in daily basis. If 
discussions are on ethnic relations and conflicts, they refer to the history of Afghanistan to prove 
their arguments. The political dominance of Pashtuns is a major historical fact, and I found it 
necessary to draw the attention of the participants to historical discussions and any other 
historical fact that is central to the discussion of the ethnic division between Pashtuns and non-
Pashtuns. Throughout all the interviews I avoided asking the participants explicit questions about 
the Pashtun political dominance and the ethnic division between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. I 
instead asked other questions to persuade them to bring up the topic of ethnic tensions and 
Pashtuns’ political dominance voluntarily without feeling pressured by the interviewer. With that 
in mind, I first, as discussed above, related my questions to the discussion of elements of unity 
and disunity in Afghanistan. After they would immediately point out to ethnic problems, as my 
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interviewing plan projected, I would encourage and give them enough time to talk about the 
topic in depth. After I noted that the discussion was narrowed to ‘ethnic issues’, I asked them 
about the roots of ethnic problems in Afghanistan. As I had planned and practiced with other 
Afghan Fulbright scholars, the question immediately would direct their attention to the history of 
Afghanistan, Pashtuns’ political dominance, and non-Pashtuns’ access to political power. These 
topics created a great environment to lead the interviewees to express their ideas and 
observations of the characteristics and roots of the ethnic wall between Pashtuns and non-
Pashtuns. 
In discussion of the roots of ethnic problems between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, my 
findings include four major roots that define the origins of ethnic issues based on the views of 
Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants. Both Pashtun and non-Pashtun participants insisted on 
two issues each. 
Table 14: 
Roots	  of	  Ethnic	  Problems	  in	  Afghanistan	  Non-­‐Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Scholars	   -­‐ Pashtuns’	  political	  dominance	  Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Scholars	   -­‐ Lack	  of	  an	  official	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  census	  	  -­‐ Foreign	  Countries’	  Role	  
6.5	  	   Roots	  of	  Ethnic	  Problems	  According	  to	  Non-­‐Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Scholars	  	  	  
Three out of four non-Pashtun Fulbrighters asserted that the political dominance of 
Pashtuns has resulted in a lot of tensions in Afghanistan. By political dominance they meant how 
Pashtuns have not allowed non-Pashtuns to rule the country by claiming leadership for the past 
two and a half centuries – from 1747 to the present. One non-Pashtun Fulbright scholar 
explained the dominance this way: 
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“Root of the ethnic problems lies in the dominance of one ethnicity (Pashtuns) who have 
occupied the leadership positions just because they claim that they are the majority. 
People of other ethnic groups have developed grievances to claim that Pashtuns are not 
better than people of other ethnic groups to remain politically dominant.” Another	  non-­‐Pashtun	  scholar	  said:	  
“The dominance of one particular ethnic group (Pashtuns) roots in the history of 
Afghanistan. They have built power over centuries, and their social relations are based 
on power. In order to keep their power solely in the hands of themselves, they have 
undermined the rights of others.” 
When I asked the participant to provide me with an example of how they have 
undermined the rights of others as she asserted, the participant pointed out to the Durand line 
issue. She said that they (Pashtuns) sold some parts of Afghanistan to Pakistan, which created a 
new borderline between the two countries. This borderline is known as the Durand line, and this 
is why Afghanistan has had continuous political problems with Pakistan.  
She also added, “Now they (Pashtuns) at the state level believe their portion of power is 
undermined by people of other ethnic groups, and this adds to discrimination and separation of 
ethnic groups.” 
Another non-Pashtun participant said, “Other ethnicities have developed grievances to 
claim that Pashtuns are not better than people of other ethnic groups to deserve being politically 
dominant.” 
The next non-Pashtun participant referred to ranking of ethnic groups that is present 
among ethnic groups in society, and Pashtuns in this ranking are first. As the participant 
described it, the ranking is established based on the population size of the four major ethnic 
groups – Pashtuns (first), Tajiks (second), Hazaras (third), and Uzbeks (fourth). Since Pashtuns 
make up the largest ethnic group, they hold the first position in the ranking. Tajiks are the second 
largest ethnic group. Hazaras and Uzbeks come third and fourth respectively. Their ranking of 
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four major ethnic groups is based on the population census that was documented several decades 
ago before the war.  
“Afghans have ranked themselves as Pashtuns (ranked first), Tajiks (ranked second), 
Hazaras (ranked third) and Uzbeks (ranked fourth) and they discriminate against the 
minorities. At the same time, they compete between each other.” 
6.6	   Roots	  of	  Ethnic	  Problems	  According	  to	  Pashtun	  Fulbright	  Scholars	  	  
Although Pashtun Fulbright scholars were reluctant to discuss the political dominance of 
their ethnic group, I still tried to lead the conversations to this topic. My efforts to do so with 
Pashtun Fulbright scholars did not help because neither the Pashtun Fulbright scholars 
volunteered to raise this issue in the interviews, nor did I want to directly ask them for their 
opinions on Pashtuns’ political dominance. Though, as I had arranged my questions for the 
purpose of planning how to start, lead, and end the interviews, I would ask the Pashtun Fulbright 
participants for their views about ethnic tensions on the “Afghan national anthem”.  
Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns have engaged in debates over the issue of national anthem 
since 2003, because most of non-Pashtuns were unhappy with the Pashtuns’ demand to change 
the national anthem from Persian Language to Pashtun Language. During the establishment of 
the constitution in 2003, Pashtuns succeeded to win the bargain against non-Pashtuns. Adeney 
has written about the tension between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over the language of the 
national anthem in 2003: 
“Establishment of the constitution in 2003 proceeded extensive deliberations and 
bargaining. Language and dominance by Pashtuns were the issues. Initially in the 
convention of the constitution, Pashtuns had objected to the quality of their language 
with Persian. They had demanded that Pashtu be the only national language and the 
national anthem only be sung in it. Though, their objections only managed to secure 
agreement only on the anthem issue. Pashtu and Persian were accepted as the official 
languages, and other languages too where necessary. The deliberations and bargaining 
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were all rooted in fear of Pashtun domination existing in Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and 
other ethnic groups. (2008, 540-554)  
Since the issue of national anthem is related to the ethnic debates between Pashtuns and 
non-Pashtuns, asking the Pashtun Fulbright participants about their thoughts on the issue 
persuaded them to at least express their opinion on whether it was a good decision to change the 
language of national anthem by Pashtuns or not, and why.  
All of the Pashtun Fulbright participants said that the national anthem should not be 
changed anymore and must remain in Pashtu Language. Two of them also argued that the ethnic 
problems are rooted in lack of neutral and official census, because, based on their explanations, 
Afghans will have to accept that Pashtuns are the majority of Afghan population, and therefore 
the national anthem must be sung in Pashtu Language. One Pashtun Fulbright participant stated: 
“The government should come up with official census, so Afghans know what ethnicity is 
the majority. For example, people debate on whether the national anthem remain in the 
Pashtu language or not. My opinion is that if we know that Pashtuns, who are speakers of 
the Pashtu language, are the majority, then the national anthem should be in Pashtu 
Language.” 
Although no Pashtun Fulbright participant explained why Pashtuns have been dominant 
or remain dominant and why they should be considered a privileged ethnic group, their answer to 
the question on national anthem implies that the first ranked position of the Pashtun ethnicity and 
the political dominance of Pashtuns must be considered feasible because Pashtuns constitute the 
majority of the population. In other words, the fact that they are the largest ethnic group answers 
why they have held the political leadership of the country for a very long period of time in the 
history, and why they should be considered a better or superior ethnic group according to the 
words of non-Pashtun participants.  
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The second source that Pashtun participants referred to as the root of ethnic tensions in 
Afghanistan was the ‘role of foreign countries.’ Three out of four Pashtun Fulbright scholars 
stated that the problems among ethnic groups are all created by the interference and roles of 
foreign countries in the political affairs of Afghanistan. One Pashtun participant said: 
“Problems are created by our neighbors. We have the worst neighbors in the world. One 
neighbor attacks our culture and another neighbor sends terrorists to our country which 
both intensify the ethnic tensions.”  
When I asked the participant to elaborate on how terrorism, produced by our neighbor in 
his words, creates ethnic problems, he replied “when Hazaras were kidnapped by terrorists in 
the Zabul Province few months ago, people (non-Pashtuns) tended to create a perception that 
they were kidnapped and abducted by Pashtuns but not the terrorists.”  
We should keep in mind that by ‘foreign countries’ they did not point only to 
Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. When discussing the violent ethnic incident that took place 
two years ago between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun students at Kabul University over language 
of the name of the institution, a Pashtun participant asserted that “a name is so important to 
Afghans because foreign countries wish to keep the conflicts and chaos going in our society so 
that they apply the ‘divide and rule’ strategy and we remain engaged in conflicts.” 
Based on the discussion of the findings in this section, the next section will answer the 
two central questions of this research – “Is non-Pashtun” only an ethnic identity or also an 
ethnic boundary? How is it constructed?” 
7.	  Analysis	  
The data presented above indicate that Pashtun and non-Pashtun Fulbright participants, 
despite sharing similar views on certain concepts, have distinct views on the general discussion 
of national unity, disunity as well as the roots of ethnic problems in Afghanistan. The distinction 
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in their views suggests that the “non-Pashtun” notion is not only an identity, but is more an 
ethnic boundary. “Non-Pashtun” is a pan-ethnic identity formed based on the individual ethnic 
identity (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, etc.). In other words, the individual ethnic identity of non-
Pashtun Fulbright scholars becomes the basis for adding the “non-Pashtun” layering of 
identification to their individual ethnic identity in order to be able to distinguish themselves from 
Pashtuns. They attempt to distinguish themselves because they perceive their individual ethnic 
groups politically and economically disadvantaged by the long-standing dominance of Pashtuns 
as the advantaged ethnic group. With that in mind, they are ready to negotiate their individual 
ethnic identity by adding the “non-Pashtun” pan-ethnic layer in order to reach resources and 
political power by removing the fear of continuous domination and exclusion by the Pashtuns in 
the state. The ethnic behavior of non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars is a rational behavior which 
attempts to benefit from the modernization of Afghan society. 
7.1	   “Non-­‐Pashtun”	  as	  an	  Identity	  	  
Some scholars have suggested that common race, language, culture, appearance, 
ancestry, and regionality are the notions that form an ethnic identity (Kearney 1978; Yinger 
1985; Sanders 2002; Kastoryano and Schader 2014; Horowitz 1985). None of these concepts, 
however, plays a role in motivating non-Pashtuns to form the “non-Pashtun” pan-ethnic identity. 
Race is not a marker of identity in Afghanistan at all and it has zero presence in society. Tajiks, 
Hazaras, Uzbeks, and members of any ethnic groups in Afghanistan other than ‘Pashtuns’ do not 
communicate in the same language. Each ethnic group has its own distinct ethnic culture. 
Although phenotype (bodily physical appearance) distinguishes people of different ethnic groups 
in other countries, Afghans as a whole are very replicating. In other words, appearance does not 
even have a role in differentiation of Pashtuns from non-Pashtun, let alone the non-Pashtuns 
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from each other. They come from different ancestors, and Afghans of all non-Pashtun ethnic 
groups are very much spread out in the entire country and there is no single Afghan province in 
which members of only one ethnic group would inhabit. All the provinces of the country are 
home to members of multiple ethnic groups.  
Although commonality in some of these concepts such as language, culture, and ancestry 
do distinguish one ethnicity from another in Afghanistan, they do not distinguish Pashtuns from 
non-Pashtuns because non-Pashtuns, as members of one pan-ethnic identity, do not have any of 
these concepts in common. It is, rather, the “grievance” as a common cause that motivates them 
to reconcile their individual ethnic identity and speak on behalf of all non-Pashtun ethnic groups 
at times. As one of the non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars pointed out that “people of other ethnic 
groups have developed grievances to claim that Pashtuns are not better than people of other 
ethnic groups to remain politically dominant”, the common belief that they have been subject to 
unfair treatment by being politically dominated, or disadvantaged, or less privileged by the 
Pashtun ethnic group is, I argue, the only common motivation among non-Pashtun Fulbright 
scholars.  
According to Barth, the notion of ethnicity is a kind of labeling process engaged in by 
oneself and others. In other words, the dialectical process of what you think of you ethnicity is 
and what they think your ethnicity is the producer of the internal and external opinions that best 
explains the notion of “non-Pashtun” as an identity. The internal opinion is the non-Pashtuns’ 
perception of their individual ethnicity. The external opinion is what non-Pashtuns think what 
Pashtuns’ perception of their individual ethnic group is. Non-Pashtuns stated that (i) ethnic 
competition or rivalries over resources, (ii) their access to political power being limited by 
Pashtuns in the leadership, and (iii) Pashtuns’ political dominance disadvantage them. This is the 
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internal opinion, or what each non-Pashtun scholar thinks his/her individual ethnicity’s position 
is in comparison to the ‘Pashtun ethnicity’. Moreover, they said that Pashtuns as a whole argue 
that they come from the best ethnic group in the country. This implies that non-Pashtuns already 
have a perception of Pashtuns’ perception of their (non-Pashtuns) individual ethnic groups. In 
other words, their argument shows that non-Pashtun scholars believe that Pashtuns perceive 
other ethnic groups (non-Pashtuns) are not as privileged as Pashtuns themselves are. The 
perception non-Pashtuns demonstrated of their individual ethnic group and the perception they 
claimed to have of Pashtuns’ perception of other ethnic groups (non-Pashtuns) as a whole, both 
as the internal opinion and external opinion are the factors that constitute the labeling process to 
create the ‘non-Pashtun’ identity.  
7.2	   “Non-­‐Pashtun”	  as	  a	  Boundary	  	  
Nagel has argued, “Ethnic identity is most closely associated with the issue of 
boundaries.” According to him, ethnic boundaries determine who is a member and who is not 
and designate which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at a particular 
time and place. Although it is clear that the boundary the non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars sought 
to draw –by explaining what ethnic elements add to the national unity and disunity and why the 
political dominance of Pashtuns is a problem– was to exclude Pashtuns from their “non-Pashtun” 
ethnic category, the purpose of an ethnic identity is not only to draw a borderline between two 
more ethnic groups. In discussion of ethnic boundary, it is important to note that the purpose of 
an ethnic borderline is to attach rewards to one or more ethnicities. Not only non-Pashtuns tend 
to distinguish themselves as the disadvantaged group, but construction of their pan-ethnic 
identity is also meant to compete and attach rewards and interests to their larger pan-ethnic level 
of identification. 
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7.3	   “Non-­‐Pashtun”	  as	  a	  Layer	  	  
This larger pan-ethnic level of identification is a “layer” produced based on the individual 
ethnic identity of non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars. In other words, it is a layer identity. Sally 
McBeth introduced the term “layering” in 1989 in a study of western Oklahoma Indian 
communities. McBeth argued that “layering” of identity is produced to combine with the 
ascriptive character of ethnicity to reveal the negotiated nature of ethnic identity. In other words, 
the additional layer of identity is considered as a means to reach privilege. As I have argued that 
the non-Pashtun pan-identity is a layer, this layer is produced by non-Pashtuns to reveal that the 
nature of their individual ethnic identity (either Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, or any ethnicity other than 
Pashtuns) is open to negotiate their individual ethnic identity and represent themselves as 
members of the pan-ethnic identity non-Pashtuns for the sake of competition with Pashtuns.  
The long-standing dominance of Pashtuns in the Afghan political state is the major 
motivation behind production of this layering process. As the findings indicate, the political 
domination of Pashtuns have restricted access of non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and as I argued that 
the non-Pashtun ethnic identity is also a boundary placed for competition over resources, the 
political power in the state level is the greatest resource. According to Paul Brass (1985), the 
state is not simply an arena or a tool; the state itself is the greatest reward and resource over 
which groups engage in a non-stop struggle. Therefore, we can draw two conclusions in regards 
to the relationship of Pashtuns’ political dominance and the non-Pashtun identity. First, the 
privileges Pashtuns as a whole enjoy come from the state power dominated by their ethnic group. 
Second, competing for reaching the state power and/or vanishing the dominance of Pashtuns’ 
dominance to remove the fear of continuous domination and exclusion is the major motivation 
behind the construction of the “non-Pashtun” pan-ethnic identity and boundary. The civil war in 
	   46	  
the former Yugoslavia is a good example of ethnic political competition. The long-standing 
grievances of the various warring linguistic and religious groups there did not erupt into combat 
until the Soviet Union lifted the threat of intervention in the late 1980s and opened the door to 
the possibility of ethno-political competition. The result was an armed scramble for territory 
based on a fear of domination or exclusion by larger and more powerful ethnic groups. 
7.4	   ‘Pashtun’	  and	  ‘non-­‐Pashtun’	  Group	  Formation	  Driven	  by	  Modernization	  	  	   Afghanistan has never been a modernized society. Even though a few components of 
modernization were present in the country until the war against the Soviet Union sparked, the 
society was yet not fully modernized. Women had the freedom to wear a headscarf or western 
clothes; education was growing fast; and the people had jobs and access to economic resources, 
but the society was still in the process of modernization. Its economy was dependent on foreign 
aid as today; the country was not as technologically sophisticated as other modernized countries; 
and neither did all women enjoy freedom, as discrimination against women and conservative 
practices were still present in society. Given the status of modernization of Afghanistan 
throughout history, I argue that the ethnic boundary between the Pashtun ethnic group and non-
Pashtun ethnic groups has been fueled by the modernization process of Afghan society. My 
argument is built on Robert Bates’s theoretical framework based on rational choice theory in 
Ethnic Competition and Modernization in African Societies (1974). 
Bates argued that the foundation for ethnic group formation and ethnic competition is 
based on modernization of societies. Although he acknowledges that there are other reasons for 
the existence and behavior of ethnic groups, and also that modernization can take place without 
ethnic groups forming and competing, the two phenomena do intersect and the process of 
modernization can promote ethnic group formation as a rational act to attempt to benefit from the 
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modernization of society (1974, 181). In other words, modernization promotes competition, and 
the competition assumes ethnic form, because “modernity is valued; equally as important, the 
goods it represents are scarce in proportion to the demand for them. The inevitable is that people 
compete” (1974, 169). 
According to Bates, the members of the advantaged ethnic group are driven to defend 
their leading position because modernity creates status differentiation. They apply strategies for 
sustaining their privileged positions.  Since modernity is desired by everyone in society, 
members of the less the disadvantaged ethnic group/s on the other hand place immense pressure 
on the advantaged group to share the advantages derived from their privileged positions. As a 
result, a sense of threat and disadvantage is created. Particularly in the competition for jobs, they 
realize that they experience disadvantages and that they are placed at a disadvantaged position 
(1974, 175). Therefore, they perceive this position in ethnic terms, and they activate their sense 
of ethnic obligation to determine their individual advancement by their own collective resistance 
in order to gain access to modern sectors (1974, 176). 
In addition to the competition over scarce resources, political competition in modernizing 
society leads to group formation too. According to Bates, “it is not just power that is at stake in 
the political arena, but also the benefit which power can bring: control over the distribution of 
modernity itself” (1974, 177). In such a situation, even electoral competition arouses ethnic 
conflicts. Therefore, politicians encourage formation of competitively aligned ethnic groups for 
benefits of modernity, the state power, and the prestige it confers. Since society is still in the 
modernization stage during which the resources are scarce and one ethnic group is advantaged 
over other/s, individuals perceive economic success in ethnic terms and rely on ethnic political 
competition as well.  
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The fact that Afghanistan has never been a modernized country and is still in the process 
of modernization implies that resources are scarce and this scarcity contributes to ethnic 
competition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. By negotiating their individual ethnic identity 
and forming the group identity non-Pashtun, non-Pashtun individuals are collectively engaged in 
competition to benefit from the modernization of society as a rational act.  
As the modernization process moves forward and non-Pashtuns initiate collective 
attempts, Pashtuns feel the need to defend their advantaged position. Pashtuns tend to apply 
methods to sustain their privileged position. For example, a Pashtun Fulbright scholar argued 
that the root of ethnic problems in Afghanistan is the lack of an official and up-to-date census. 
While an up-to-date official census might not be a significant determinant of ethnic problems to 
non-Pashtuns, an up-do-date official census would allow Pashtuns to restore their privileged 
position by claiming to be the largest ethnic group. As Pashtuns now make attempts to restore 
their privileged ethnic status, members of non-Pashtun ethnic groups put pressure on Pashtuns to 
share the advantages derived from their politically dominant position. Having experienced 
disadvantages and having perceived their weak position to be associated with their ethnicity, they 
feel threatened by the dominance of Pashtuns who are controlling the direction and distribution 
of scarce modern resources through the state. This is why non-Pashtun individuals have activated 
their sense of ethnic obligation, believing that their individual success is determined by being 
part of the non-Pashtun pan-ethnic identity to resist the Pashtuns’ dominance in the state. They 
have realized that state power is the benefit that can secure control over the distribution of 
modernity itself. 
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8.	  Conclusion	  
Ethnic conflict is a major social issue in Afghanistan. There are always conflicts present 
between ethnic groups. The Afghan civil war started as jihad but it ended with an ethnic 
character. At least since the start of the 20th century, ethnicity has played a significant role in 
shaping social relations. Pashtun political dominance has led non-Pashtun ethnic groups to create 
their own solidarity in order to tackle the Pashtuns’ dominance in the Afghan state. These ethnic 
groups, then, share the same non-Pashtun ethnic identity. Despite the presence of various ethnic 
tensions among all ethnicities, and Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in particular in Afghanistan, there 
is a dearth of scholarship on ethnic identity and relations in Afghanistan. However, this research 
sheds a little light on the concept non-Pashtun as an identity and boundary, and the way it is 
constructed.  
Based on the data collected from eight Afghan Fulbright scholars (4 Pashtun vs. 4 non-
Pashtun), this research’s analysis indicated that the “non-Pashtun” notion is not only an identity, 
but is moreover an ethnic boundary. “Non-Pashtun” is a pan-ethnic identity formed based on the 
individual ethnic identity (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, etc.). In other words, the individual ethnic 
identity of non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars becomes the basis for adding the “non-Pashtun” 
layering of identification to their individual ethnic identity in order to be able to distinguish 
themselves from Pashtuns. They attempt to distinguish themselves because they perceive their 
individual ethnic groups politically and economically disadvantaged by the long-standing 
dominance of Pashtuns as the advantaged ethnic group. With that in mind, they are ready to 
negotiate their individual ethnic identity by adding the “non-Pashtun” pan-ethnic layer in order 
to reach resources and political power by removing the fear of continuous domination and 
exclusion by the Pashtuns in the state. The analysis also suggested that the ethnic behavior of 
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non-Pashtun Fulbright scholars is a rational behavior which attempts to benefit from the 
modernization of Afghan society.  
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to be in the research study of “Everyone Has Ethnic-oriented Objectives in 
Afghanistan:” A study of Ethnic Identity in Pashtun and non-Pashtun Afghan Fulbright Students.  
You were selected as a possible participant because either you have completed a graduate degree 
or you’re still completing a graduate degree in the United States on Fulbright Scholarship 
program. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to 
be in the study. 
 
This study is being conducted by: Sayed Hamid Akbary, a graduate student at Department of 
Sociology of Lehigh under the direction of Dr. Hugo Ceron-Anaya, Professor of Sociology at 
Lehigh University. 
 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to understand Afghan Fulbright students/alumni’s choices and 
observations of social and political issues of Afghanistan to promote nationalism in the 
country. 
 
Procedures 
If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to fill out the questionnaire attached to 
this consent form; submit it; and later, if selected to be part of the sample for this study, 
you will answer a number of open-ended questions on some socio-political issues of 
Afghanistan in an interview. Filling out the survey questionnaire will take three to five 
minutes, and if later selected, the interview will take 15 to 20 minutes. 
 
Risks and Benefits of being in the study 
Possible risks:  
There is minimal risk to you in this study. The only risk of your participation in this study 
will be concerned with confidentiality of your responses. However, please be advised that 
your responses and any information you provide us now and in future will remain 
confidential. 
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The benefits to participation are: 
There are two great advantages in participating in this study: first, the researcher will advantage 
from your scholarly views on some socio-political issues of Afghanistan for his research so that 
the issues challenging nationalism in Afghanistan could be overcome. Second, your responses 
for this study will greatly influence other Afghan youth to have a stronger sense of nationalism in 
the Afghan society at large.  
 
Compensation 
There is no compensation considered for being in this study. 
 
Confidentiality 
The records of this study will be kept private and confidential. In any sort of reports published, 
no information by which a subject would be identified will be used. Research records will be 
stored securely and only the researcher will have access to the records. Your responses will be 
used for education purposes and they will be erased later permanently. Because it will be 
essential to have a record of all your responses for better analysis, your responses in the 
interview will be audio-recorded. Therefore, if you consent to having your participation in this 
study audio recorded, please check the box below. 
☐ Yes, I consent to having my participation in the study audio recorded. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
Participation in this study is voluntary:  
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with 
the researcher and Institute of International Studies (IIE). If you decide to participate both in this 
survey and later in interview (if selected), you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at 
any time without affecting those relationships.  
 
Contacts and Questions 
The researchers conducting this study are: 
Sayed Hamid Akbary and Dr. Hugo Ceron-Anaya. You may ask any questions you have now. If 
you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact Dr. Hugo Ceron-Anaya in Bethlehem 
Pennsylvania at 610-758-3627 and hrc209@lehigh.edu. 
 
Questions or Concerns: 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone 
other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact Naomi Coll, Lehigh University’s 
Manager of Research Integrity, at (610) 758-2985 (email: nac314@lehigh.edu).  All reports or 
correspondence will be kept confidential. 
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You may keep a copy of this information for your future records. 
 
Statement of Consent 
If you have read and agree to the above terms, and consent to participate in this survey and later 
in an interview (if selected), please check the box for “yes”, fill out the questionnaire and submit 
it. Otherwise, you can check “no,” and refuse to take part.  
☐ Yes, I have read and agree to the above terms and consent to participate in this survey and in 
an interview if selected. 
☐ No, I refuse to take part in the survey and interview.  
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Survey	  Questionnaire	  
	  
Demographic	  Information	  	  Name:	  _________________	   	  Gender:	   	   ____	  Male	   _____	  Female	  	  What	  is	  your	  age?	  _____	  	  What	  is	  your	  marital	  status?	  	  ___	  Single	   	   ___	  Married	   _____	  Divorced	  _____	  Widowed	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___	  Other	  (Please	  specify	  :)	  	  	  	  	  	  ________________________________	  	  Where	  were	  you	  born	  (city,	  district,	  and	  province)?	  	  ___________________________	  	  What	  year	  did	  you	  first	  begin	  your	  most	  recent	  Fulbright	  graduate	  program	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  ___	  	  How	  long	  you	  have	  been	  away	  from	  Afghanistan	  for?	  __________________	  	  Name	  of	  the	  university	  that	  you	  attended	  or	  you	  are	  attending	  as	  a	  Fulbright	  student:	  	  ________________	  	  Your	  email	  address:	  _____________________	  	  What	  is	  your	  major?	  _____________________	  	  
Ethnicity	  and	  Language	  	  Please	  state	  the	  ethnicity	  of	  the	  following?	  	  	   Your	  ethnicity	  	  	  	  _________________________	  	   Your	  father’s	  ethnicity	  Your	  mother’s	  ethnicity	  	   Your	  spouse’s	  ethnicity	  (if	  married)	  	  In	  what	  language	  do	  you	  communicate	  with	  the	  following	  individuals?	  	  	   	   	   	   	   Pashtu	  	  	   Persian	   	   Uzbeki	  	   Other	  	  	   Mother	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	  	   Father	  	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	  	   Siblings	   1	   2	   3	   4	  	   Spouse	  (if	  married)	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	  	   Children	  (if	  you	  have	  any)	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	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  In	  what	  language	  did	  you	  receive	  the	  following?	  	   	  	   	   Pashtu	   	  Persian	   Other	  	  	   Elementary	  education	   1	   2	   3	  	   Secondary	  education	   1	   2	   3	  	   High	  school	  education	   1	   2	   3	  	  For	  your	  two	  closest	  friends,	  what	  is	  their	  ethnicity?	  	  	   Friend	  1:	  	  ___________________________	  	   Friend	  2:	  	  ___________________________	  	  For	  your	  two	  closest	  friends,	  in	  what	  language	  do	  you	  communicate	  with	  them?	  	  	   Friend	  1:	  	  ___________________________	  	   Friend	  2:	  	  ___________________________	  	  
Personal	  Choices	  	  What	  is	  your	  favorite	  province?__________________	  	  Who	  is	  your	  favorite	  Afghan	  singer?	  _________________________	  	  Who	  is	  your	  favorite	  Afghan	  poet?	  ________________________	  	  When	  in	  Afghanistan,	  what	  local	  language/s	  do	  you	  usually	  watch	  TV	  in?	  	  
Socio-­‐economic	  Status	  	  What	  is	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  education	  of	  parents?	  	  	   	   	   Below	  High	  School	   	  	   High	  School	   Two	  Year	  Diploma	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  College	   Graduate	  	  Mother’s	  Education:	   	   1	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  3	   	  	  Father’s	  Education:	   	   1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  3	  	  Have	  you	  or	  any	  members	  of	  your	  family	  visited	  any	  European	  countries	  and	  the	  United	  States	  for	  sightseeing?	   _____Yes	   _____	  No	  	  Does	  any	  member	  of	  your	  family	  perform	  the	  Eid	  prayer	  with	  the	  President	  and/or	  governor?	   ____	  Yes	   _____	  No	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  Do	  you	  have	  any	  of	  these	  people	  hired	  for	  your	  family’s	  service?	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	   	   	   	   No	  	   Cook:	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  	   	   	  	  2	  Security	  Person:	   	   	   	  	  	  1	   	   	   	   	  	  2	  Cleaning	  Person:	   	   	   	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  	   	   	  	  2	  Driver:	   	   	   	   	  	  	  1	   	   	   	   	  	  2	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11.	  Vita	  Sayed	  Hamid	  Akbary	  was	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Kabul,	  Afghanistan.	  He	  obtained	  his	  bachelor’s	  degree	  in	  English	  Language	  and	  Literature	  from	  Kabul	  University	  in	  2010,	  and	  after	  his	  graduation	  he	  worked	  for	  national	  and	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  (UNDP),	  Strategic	  Social	  International,	  and	  Women	  Assistance	  Association	  (WAA).	  In	  2013,	  he	  received	  a	  Fulbright	  scholarship	  from	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  pursue	  his	  master’s	  degree	  in	  Sociology	  at	  Lehigh	  University	  located	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  United	  States.	  	  Ethnic	  identity,	  nationalism,	  and	  gender	  and	  Islam	  are	  his	  areas	  of	  research	  interest.	  Specifically,	  he	  is	  interested	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